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Abstract
Over the past decade, pandemics caused by pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza virus in 2009 and severe acute respiratory
syndrome virus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in 2019 have emerged. Both are high-impact respiratory pathogens originating from animals.
Their wide distribution in the human population subsequently results in an increased risk of human-to-animal transmission:
reverse zoonosis. Although there have only been rare reports of reverse zoonosis events associated with the ongoing
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic from SARS-CoV-2 so far, comparison with the pH1N1 influenza pandemic can
provide a better understanding of the possible consequences of such events for public and animal health. The results of our review
suggest that similar factors contribute to successful crossing of the host species barriers in both pandemics. Specific risk factors
include sufficient interaction between infected humans and recipient animals, suitability of the animal host factors for productive
virus infection, and suitability of the animal host population for viral persistence. Of particular concern is virus spread to sus-
ceptible animal species, in which group housing and contact network structure could potentially result in an alternative virus
reservoir, from which reintroduction into humans can take place. Virus exposure in high-density populations could allow sus-
tained transmission in susceptible animal species. Identification of the risk factors and serological surveillance in SARS-CoV-2-
susceptible animal species that are group-housed should help reduce the threat from reverse zoonosis of COVID-19.
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Emerging viral diseases are an important threat for public
health. Manyof these diseases are zoonotic, in the sense that
their original source is animals. Sporadically, these emerging
viral diseases can lead to pandemics in humans. When such a
pandemic occurs, the high number of infected people can in
turn form a source of infection for animals: reverse zoonosis.
There are 2 main concerns about such reverse zoonosis
events. First, the infected animals can become ill and even
die; second, the population of animals in question can become
a virus reservoir, from which reintroduction into humans can
take place.
For any virus spillover between species, including reverse
zoonosis, several barriers need to be breached.24 There must
be sufficient contact between donor species (in this case, an
infected human being) and recipient species and enough
compatibility between the virus and the new host to allow
replication and the possibility of transmission to other mem-
bers of the recipient species. If this transmission can occur,
the contact network structure of the recipient species,
together with variations in transmission through this network,
are critical in determining whether the virus will persist or
die out.
Currently, the pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) is ongoing, and the causative virus, severe acute
respiratory syndrome virus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2), is becoming
more widely distributed in the human population.78 Already
there are several reports of reverse zoonosis events, involving
domestic cats and dogs, tigers, lions, and American mink
(Fig. 1).37,38,42,45,60 To get a better understanding about the
possible consequences of such events for public health and
animal health, we think that it is worthwhile to review what
happened during the H1N1 influenza pandemic (pH1N1) in
2009 (Fig. 2). Although pH1N1 influenza is caused by a dif-
ferent virus, it is similar to COVID-19 in that it targets the
respiratory tract and is often transmitted by respiratory dro-
plets. Importantly, there is an overlap in host range of the 2
viruses. We also present clinical features, necropsy, and his-
topathological findings of SARS-CoV-2 and pH1N1 virus
infection in different animal species in order to raise aware-
ness of people in the field on the inclusion of these virus
infections in their differential diagnosis during the ongoing
pandemic period.
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Events of human-to-pig transmission were the most frequently
reported reverse zoonosis of pH1N1 influenza. The first cases
of human-origin pH1N1 virus infections in a pig farm were
reported in Canada just 1 month after pH1N1 influenza had
spread worldwide in the human population.18 Epidemiologic
evidence for human-to-pig transmission was based on pigs
testing positive by qPCR (quantitative polymerase chain reac-
tion) for pH1N1 virus RNA after contact with farmers who
were infected with pH1N1 virus.15,17 Sequencing analysis
showed that the viruses infecting humans and pigs were highly
similar, indicating no virus adaptation was necessary for
Figure 1. Reverse zoonosis events of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Numbers indicate the reference of the publication or report.
Arrows pointing from human to animal represent reverse zoonosis events. Solid arrows represent likely human-to-animal transmission
confirmed by viral RNA, sequencing data, or virus isolation. Dashed arrows represent possible human-to-animal transmission showed by
serological data. “P” represents persistent infection in an animal host species.
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replication in pigs.15,63 Since then, pH1N1 virus has repeatedly
spread from human to pigs globally, resulting in genetic diver-
sity of pH1N1 viruses in pig populations.35 In pigs infected
with pH1N1 virus, mild or asymptomatic respiratory diseases
were observed. Histopathologic changes consisted of multifo-
cal broncho-interstitial pneumonia with suppurative alveolitis,
suggesting secondary bacterial coinfections. Sustained trans-
mission between pigs has been reported in both natural and
experimental studies,6,50,67 suggesting that pigs can act as a
reservoir for pH1N1 virus.
The domestic turkey is another food animal species in which
reverse zoonosis of pH1N1 influenza has occurred. Sporadic
Figure 2. Reverse zoonosis events of pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza. Numbers indicate the reference of the publication or report. Arrows
pointing from human to animal represent reverse zoonosis events. Arrows pointing from animal to human represent “reverse-reverse
zoonosis” events. Solid arrows represent likely human-to-animal transmission confirmed by viral RNA, sequencing data, or virus isolation.
Dashed arrows represent possible human-to-animal transmission showed by serological data. “P” represents persistent infection in an animal
host species.
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infections of pH1N1 virus have been reported mainly in turkey
breeder flocks. Human-to-turkey transmission of pH1N1 virus
potentially occurred during artificial insemination (AI), based
on the evidence that farm workers had been sick with flu-like
symptoms during the AI period and subsequently had antibo-
dies against pH1N1 virus. Phylogenetic analysis of pH1N1
virus isolated from infected farm workers and turkeys were
grouped in the same cluster, supporting human-to-turkey trans-
mission.61 Evidence of pH1N1 antibody in serum, viral RNA
from oropharyngeal and cloacal swab specimens and virus iso-
lation from specific pathogen free fowl embryonated eggs indi-
cated pH1N1 influenza in turkey breeder flocks.54,61 No to mild
clinical signs except for reduced numbers of eggs were
observed in affected flocks.47,54,61 pH1N1 virus was detected
in reproductive tissues as well as the cecal tonsils and bursa of
Fabricius, and no lesions were detected in other tissues.47,61
This corresponds to experimental infections, where turkeys
developed clinical signs only after intracloacal but not after
intranasal inoculation with pH1N1 virus, even though intrana-
sal inoculation is a successful route of pH1N1 virus inoculation
in other species.47 Remarkably, besides domestic turkeys,
pH1N1 virus infections have not been reported in other avian
species.
pH1N1 virus infections in American mink (Neovison vison)
were first reported in a mink farm in Norway during the pan-
demic. Although the source of transmission was unclear, phy-
logenetic analysis of sequences derived from affected mink
were highly similar to human derived-isolates during the
pH1N1 pandemic. The infection might have been transmitted
from subclinically infected farm workers or virus-
contaminated feed from infected pig offal. The infected mink
kits developed severe respiratory disease and had increased
mortality rates. Pathological changes included acute to suba-
cute interstitial pneumonia with edema, lymphocyte infiltra-
tion, and epithelial hyperplasia. pH1N1 virus antigen was
mainly observed in the nuclei of the epithelial lining of bronchi
and bronchioles and also of pneumocytes in the alveolar septa.1
Pets
Many cases of pH1N1 virus infection were documented in
domestic dogs, domestic cats, and pet ferrets. pH1N1 viral
RNA was detected from nasal swab and pharyngeal specimens,
and from necropsy tissues including tonsils, trachea, and
lungs.9,25 Phylogenetic analysis of isolated pH1N1 virus from
affected animals revealed a close relationship to pH1N1 virus
in humans during the pandemic.14,26,66 Influenza-like illness
was reported from family members prior to signs of
influenza-like illness in affected animals.9,26,43,66 In addition,
influenza A virus was detected by influenza A virus rapid test
in a family member before animals exhibited respiratory
signs.66 Thus, the chronology of events and the detection of
influenza A virus in a family member suggest that infected
owners were the source of infection in dogs, cats, and ferrets
in their household. Due to the close contact between owners
and their companion animals, serological surveillance was
performed. Antibodies against pH1N1 virus were detected in
cats and dogs during the period of virus spread in the human
population. Although the exact mode of transmission is
unclear, it is possible that this occurred due to human-to-
animal transmission, since pet animals frequently live together
and are in close contact with humans.13,77 Serological studies
showed that group housing of animals likely facilitated effi-
cient intraspecies transmission, including cat-to-cat transmis-
sion and ferret-to-ferret transmission.3,8,14 However, pH1N1
virus transmission between dogs seemed to be limited.25
Although all these species were susceptible for pH1N1 virus
infection, clinical signs varied among them. While cats and
ferrets often developed severe respiratory signs, including dys-
pnea, coughing, and sneezing, and even died from the infec-
tion,8,9,23,43,53,64 dogs either showed no clinical signs or only
mild respiratory signs, such as rhinorrhea and coughing.25,43
Correlated to the severity of disease, pathological changes in
fatally infected cats and ferrets consisted of multifocal severe
necrotizing broncho-interstitial pneumonia,27,62 while no obvi-
ous lesions were observed in dogs.25
Captive Wild Animals
pH1N1 virus was reported to infect wild animals maintained in
captivity, nearly all of which were carnivores held in zoos.
Several zoo carnivores including a cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus),
a Bornean binturong (Arctictis binturong penicillatus), an
American badger (Taxidea taxus), a black-footed ferret (Mus-
tela nigripes), and a giant panda (Ailuropoda melanoleuca)
were susceptible to pH1N1 virus infection.11,29,58 The source
of infection in these cases was not determined due to lack of
availability of clinical samples from humans with close con-
tact. However, all affected animals were in contact with care-
takers or veterinarians, and were housed separately from other
wildlife.11,29,58 This suggests that animals may have been
infected by humans even though the latter did not show clinical
symptoms. Although no viral RNA detection or virus isolation
from the potential human sources of virus were performed,
phylogenetic analysis showed that viruses isolated from
infected animals were highly similar to pH1N1 virus circulat-
ing among humans during the pandemic and the subsequent
seasonal influenza period.11 While the cheetah, the Bornean
binturong, the American badger, and the giant panda exhibited
severe respiratory signs of infection—hematopnea and dys-
pnea—no clinical signs were reported in the black-footed
ferret.11,29,58
Besides in zoo carnivores, there was evidence of pH1N1
virus infection in Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) based
on the presence of pH1N1 antibodies. The source of infection
remains unknown, but most likely was infected mahouts, or
infected tourists who attended activities such as elephant riding
and feeding.49 Similarly to Asian elephants, pH1N1 virus–spe-
cific antibodies in nonhuman primates have been reported in
several studies. However, there is no evidence that nonhuman
primates had clinical signs of disease or mortality from pH1N1
virus infection.7,21,28 Whether animal-to-animal transmission
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can be sustained among captive wild animals, with the risk of
becoming a new reservoir, remains unknown since serological
and epidemiological studies in captive wild animals are
limited.
Free-Living Wild Animals
The only free-living wild animal species in which pH1N1 virus
has been reported is the striped skunk (Mephitis mephitis).
Sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of virus isolated from
affected animals were highly related to pH1N1 virus circulat-
ing in humans.4,5 The source of infection was unclear. In one
study, the skunks lived near a mink farm, suggesting that spil-
lover of pH1N1 virus from infected mink farm workers or
infected mink may have occurred.4 In the other study, the
skunks were found in an urban park where hand feeding by
park visitors normally took place.5 Clinical signs were not
noted, but purulent nasal exudate was observed in fatally
infected skunks. Histopathological changes ranged from mod-
erate, acute, suppurative rhinitis to severe
bronchopneumonia.4,5
Coronavirus Disease 2019
A decade after pandemic H1N1 influenza, the newly emerged
COVID-19 caused by SARS-CoV-2 infection has been
reported in a number of farm, pet, and wild animal species,
both in natural circumstances and experimental settings. In
some cases, human-to-animal transmission of this virus has
impacted animal welfare and caused financial loss.
Farm Animals
American mink have tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 viral
RNA in several mink farms in European countries including
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Spain.45,51,52 A study of the
outbreak in mink farms in the Netherlands reported that some
farm workers had respiratory symptoms prior to SARS-CoV-2
outbreaks in the farms. Viral RNA was detected in throat and
rectal swabs from affected mink by qPCR. In addition, viral
RNA was detected in dust particles suggesting indirect trans-
mission between mink via fomites or droplets produced by
affected mink. Importantly, serological surveillance was per-
formed in which 60 random serum samples were collected from
the outbreak mink farms. All mink, except one sample from
one mink farm, had seroconverted against SARS-CoV-2 as
tested by neutralization assay indicating previous infections
were widespread in the mink populations.45 This indicates that
the virus was originally transmitted from humans to mink, and
that there was subsequent sustained transmission among the
mink. Additionally, employees, who had tested negative for
SARS-CoV-2 RNA 2 weeks previously, developed respiratory
symptoms and tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA at
the same time that mink were diagnosed. Subsequently, whole-
genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis showed that the
sequences from affected employees were in the same cluster as
sequences derived from the mink.46 Together, data from timing
of infection, whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic anal-
ysis indicate that the virus was transmitted from mink to
humans, as a so-called “reverse-reverse zoonosis.” SARS-
CoV-2 antibodies were detected in domestic cats living on the
mink farms, indicating that they had been infected with the
virus.45 Thus, it could be that domestic cats played a role in
the spread of the virus. The infected mink mostly developed
watery nasal discharge, and some developed severe respiratory
illness. Pathologic changes in dead mink were severe acute
interstitial pneumonia.31,45 Besides in American mink, reverse
zoonosis of COVID-19 has not been documented in other farm
animal species so far.
Pets
Domestic dogs and cats from households with either confirmed
human cases of COVID-19 or asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2
infection have been reported to be infected with SARS-CoV-
2, indicating the potential of virus transmission from humans to
these species. Two out of 17 domestic dogs from owners with
SARS-CoV-2 infection were infected with SARS-CoV-2, and
did not show respiratory signs. A low load of viral RNA was
detected in nasal swabs, but not in fecal swabs from these dogs.
Sequences of viruses from 2 dogs showed strong similarity to
the virus isolated from the human cases, suggesting human-to-
animal transmission. Both infected dogs seroconverted, based
on plaque reduction neutralization assays.60 In addition, a
domestic dog in the United States was reported to have anti-
bodies against SARS-CoV-2, suggesting exposure; no viral
RNA was detected in samples from this dog.39 Serum from
another dog in the same household tested negative for SARS-
CoV2 neutralizing antibodies, suggesting dog-to-dog transmis-
sion is limited.40
In domestic cats, several reports showed SARS-CoV-2
infections in cats belonging to a SARS-CoV-2-infected owner
or a SARS-CoV-2-infected neighbor. Viral RNA was detected
from respiratory samples and gastrointestinal samples—includ-
ing vomitus and stool—of the cats, but infectious virus could
not be isolated. Sequencing analysis confirmed SARS-CoV-2
infection. Affected cats developed a wide range of clinical
signs, from mild to severe respiratory signs, as well as gastro-
intestinal signs. Sneezing and ocular discharge were observed
in mild respiratory illness38 while dyspnea was found in severe
respiratory cases.41 Vomiting was observed in an infected cat
with gastrointestinal signs.44 Most of infected animals fully
recovered, suggesting mild disease. However, some animals
died, likely due to other underlying diseases.41
Captive Wild Animals
SARS-CoV-2 infections in captive wild animals were reported
from 2 enclosures at a zoo. Viral RNA was first detected in a
nasal swab of a tiger (Panthera tigris) with respiratory signs
such as dry cough and wheezing.42 Subsequently, another 3
tigers and 2 lions (Panthera leo) at the same facility were all
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confirmed with SARS-CoV-2 infection, based on viral RNA
detection in fecal samples.37 Sequencing analysis showed that
viruses from infected animals were identical to SARS-CoV-2
in humans. These data suggest that the virus could have been
transmitted by a zookeeper who might not have developed
symptoms of COVID-19 at the time of exposure to these ani-
mals.74 Whether subsequent animal-to-animal transmission
occurred is not known.
Experimental Studies
Experimental studies have shown that a number of animal spe-
cies support SARS-CoV-2 infection. In domestic cats, ferrets,
rhesus macaques, and cynomologus macaques, high viral RNA
levels were detected by qPCR, indicating that the virus infected
and replicated efficiently in the respiratory tract of animals
without causing severe disease or death.22,33,56,59 However,
upon experimental infection, golden hamsters exhibited severe
clinical signs and pathological changes of severe interstitial
pneumonia.20 Evidence of animal-to-animal transmission has
been shown by detection of viral RNA in sentinel animals after
having direct or indirect contact with virus-inoculated animals.
In these transmission studies, sentinel cats and ferrets were
infected by SARS-CoV-2 via airborne and direct-contact trans-
mission.16,22,55,59 In contrast, low viral RNA levels were
detected in swabs collected from dogs inoculated according
to the same methods, suggesting they were less susceptible to
SARS-CoV-2 infection. In domestic pigs, chickens and domes-
tic ducks, no viral RNA was detected from any swabs and the
animals remained seronegative for 2 weeks post inoculation.
These data suggest that these livestock species were not sus-
ceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection.59
Host Species Barriers
Interaction of several factors are involved in limiting transmis-
sion of a virus infection from a donor to a recipient host spe-
cies; these represent the host species barriers to virus
infections. Thus, generally, viruses only sporadically jump
from one species to another. Specific interactions are required
to accomplish such species jumps and sustain transmission.24
In the first place, sufficient interaction between donor host and
recipient host is important, and this is a common factor for
successful species jumps in both pH1N1 and SARS-CoV-2
transmissions. Seroprevalence of pH1N1 in cats in different
cities in northeastern China revealed a higher prevalence rate
of pH1N1 in pet cats (30.6%) compared to roaming cats (11%)
tested by neutralization assay.77 Similar to pH1N1, neutraliza-
tion titer in pet cats owned by COVID-19 patients was higher
than the titer from pet hospital cats and stray cats.76 These
observations from serological surveillances suggest a likely
transmission from infected owners to their pets by close con-
tact, thus addressing the role of sufficient interaction between
donor hosts and recipient hosts in crossing the species barrier.
Although 2 host species share the same geographical area and
habitat, host behavior can either limit or enhance pathogen
transmission. Certain behaviors of humans, which enhance
close contact between infected owners or keepers and their
animals, increase the chance of reverse zoonosis. For example,
artificial insemination of domestic turkeys likely caused
pH1N1 virus spillover from infected humans to domestic tur-
keys. It could be that particular procedures of caretakers in
mink farms, such as weaning pups and vaccination, may have
led to human-to-mink transmission. Also, hand-feeding by vis-
itors, surface contamination of bedding or other fomites, or
contaminated food could be sources of spillover from humans
to animals.5,45 After the global spread of pH1N1 virus in 2009,
the virus continued to circulate in humans, resulting in normal
seasonal epidemics of influenza. This contributed to repeated
virus introductions from humans to susceptible animals. Mul-
tiple events of human-to-pig transmission occurred worldwide
during 2009 to 2014.18,36 The introduction of human pH1N1
viruses into the pig populations and subsequent co-circulation
with endemic swine influenza viruses resulted in an increase of
genetic diversity by exchange of genome segments.35 For
example, a novel reassortment (A/swine/Hong Kong/201/
2010 [H1N1]) was found during virological surveillance. This
reassortant was composed of a neuraminidase (NA) gene from
pH1N1, a hemagglutinin (HA) gene from a European avian-
like H1 virus, and the 6 internal genes from triple reassortant
H1N1 viruses.72 If the new reassortments result in increased
transmission, virulence, or immune escape, they may cause a
massive threat to humans and public health by potential gen-
eration of a new pandemic influenza virus.57,75
Not much is known about the association between genetic
diversity and pathogenicity during SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in
animals. Whole-genome sequencing analysis in SARS-CoV-2-
infected mink revealed high genetic diversity in farms which
tested negative before, suggesting a fast evolution of viruses in
the mink populations. To date, no specific mutations have been
observed that are common to all mink isolates. Even though
one specific substitution (D614G) associated with increased
virulence in vitro was present in some farm clusters, no clear
differences in clinical signs, virulence, or transmissibility to
humans were found.46 Further surveillance and sequencing
analysis are required in order to monitor amino acid substitu-
tions that may be associated with changes in disease severity or
transmission. In some cases, both pH1N1 virus and SARS-
CoV-2 infections caused relatively no or only mild signs, and
virus was transmitted before clinical symptoms became appar-
ent.15,45 These could facilitate under-detection of human-to-
animal transmission.
In the second place, virus-host interaction is important in
determining susceptibility of a new host species to a virus, and
virus transmission to other individuals in the new host species.
Similarity of biological host factors between humans and ani-
mals (for instance, receptor expression, proteases, and
enzymes) can partially determine the potential of a virus to
switch species. For example, pH1N1 virus preferentially
attaches to a2,6-linked sialic acids, which are abundantly
expressed in the upper respiratory tract of animals including
pigs, cats, and ferrets.12,34,73 Angiotensin converting enzyme 2
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(ACE2), a receptor for SARS-CoV-2, is expressed in tissues of
cats and ferrets.70 Once the virus attaches to a new host cell,
compatibility between virus proteins and host cell machinery is
required for efficient virus replication and potential transmis-
sion. Viruses that replicate to a high level are generally more
easily transmitted to other hosts. For example, pH1N1 virus
replicates efficiently in pigs, cats, and ferrets, allowing subse-
quent transmission.32,71 Similarly to pH1N1 virus infections,
SARS-CoV-2 replicates efficiently in cats and ferrets resulting
in transmission to sentinel animals. In contrast, low replication
efficiency limits virus transmissibility. For example, limited
SARS-CoV-2 replication in dogs and absence of virus replica-
tion in pigs and chickens are associated with limited or no
transmission.59
In the third place, if the transmission can occur, intraspecific
contacts in the recipient population are crucial in determining
whether the virus will persist or die. The possibility of main-
tenance of infection in a new host species depends in a complex
way on the population sizes and the degrees of mixing of donor
and recipient host species as well as the rate of virus transmis-
sion in each.24 Several lines of evidence in both pH1N1 virus
and SARS-CoV-2 infections suggest that group-housed ani-
mals have a higher chance of spreading the viruses to other
individuals of the same species, compared to animals kept
individually. High population density, high farm density, and
large herd size are the most common risk factors for influenza
virus infection in pig farms.2,65,68 The same risk factors could
also be valid for efficient SARS-CoV-2 virus transmission in
mink farms. In human COVID-19 patients, generation interval
or time between infection events in a donor and recipient pair is
around 4 to 5 days; however, high dose of virus exposure in a
high-density population could potentially reduce this interval
resulting in broad spread of infections in mink farms.46 Several
examples of efficient animal-to-animal transmissions have
been reported in a cat colony, a mink farm, and a pig
farm.14,15,45
Epidemiology and Serological Surveillance
in Reverse Zoonosis Events
For the assessment of risk for animals and humans involved
with reverse zoonosis outbreaks of pH1N1 or COVID-19, a
combination of clinical, epidemiological, sequencing analysis,
and laboratory investigations are needed. Particularly, some
infected animals show no or only mild clinical signs, which
can make it difficult to detect or apply quarantine measures.
However, those animals can develop antibodies against these
virus infections. Thus, conducting seroepidemiological studies
in outbreak areas can assist in identifying susceptible animals
and transmission within the population.15 These approaches are
also used to investigate reverse zoonosis in large-scale out-
breaks, for example, pH1N1 transmission between pig farms
and clustering of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in 16 mink farms
within the same province.45,46,69 Together with chronology of
infection, serologic evidence for infection with pH1N1 or
COVID-19 in employees and workers in outbreak areas point
out the occupational risk of human-to-animal transmission and
vice versa.10,46
Once the reverse zoonosis events occur, it is crucial to know
whether infection is maintained in an animal population and
has a potential to spillover back to humans. Therefore, contin-
ued serosurveillance in susceptible animals and other animal
species in the same area are recommended. For example,
increased seroprevalence of pH1N1 virus in cats after the
2009 pandemic was detected by serosurveillance studies sug-
gested sustained transmission of this virus in cat popula-
tions.19,30,77 To date, few serosurveillance studies have been
performed for SARS-CoV-2 in domestic dogs, cats, and mink,
indicating a need for further serosurveillance studies in human-
animal interfaces that represent a critical point for cross-species
transmission.45,46,48,76
Conclusions
Although the number of reported reverse zoonosis events of
COVID-19 are limited so far, sufficient contact between
humans and animals, compatibility between SARS-CoV-2 and
the new animal host, group housing of large numbers of ani-
mals, and the structure of the animal host’s contact network can
overcome the host species barriers. In order to assess the risk of
reverse zoonosis of COVID-19, it is crucial to determine
whether factors that allow the host species barriers to be over-
come are present for those situations where SARS-CoV-2-
infected humans are in contact with animals. Additionally,
knowledge of clinical and pathological features of SARS-
CoV-2 infection in different animal species will raise aware-
ness of the possibility of this diagnosis during the ongoing
pandemic period. Following the pandemic, serological surveil-
lance in animal populations at risk should be conducted, par-
ticularly in group-housed animals. Together, this knowledge
will improve our understanding of the potential risk for reverse
zoonosis of COVID-19.
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